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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL STUDY
PERSONNEL SECURITY: NAVY

1) Procedures and Timeframes

The Director of Naval Intelligence is authorized by the Secretary of Defense to grant, deny or revoke access to SCI. This authority has been delegated to the Commanders of the Naval Intelligence Command and Naval Security Group Command.

When an SBI is required, as with access to SCI, the Navy accepts any investigation conducted by a federal agency using DCID 1/14. There is a periodic investigation requirement for those with SCI, but the number of PRs for access to SCI is limited by a monthly quota assigned by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS). In interviews staff said this was not a problem, because even if it took a few months to get the PR done, the staff member kept their clearance through the process.

Total completion time is six to twelve months. Time frames are: two to four weeks to initiate requests (complete forms, gather information, mail it, etc.); four to five months for DIS field work; two to three months for adjudication/notification.

2) Impact of Security Investigations on the Selection Process

The Navy does not maintain data on those who withdrew their employment applications during the security process. In 1986 four applicants were not hired because they did not meet security requirements, and in 1987, three were not. Data is not available for 1985.

3) Extent of Impact of Security Process on Lifestyle/Family Issues

No staff cited the security process as a reason for leaving in 1985 - 1987.

4) Impact of Involuntary Staff Separations on Security

<u>Reason for Dismissal</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>
Performance	6	7	9
Excessive Absent.	1	1	-
Giving Clas Info to unauthorized source	1	1	-
Criminal Activity	-	-	2
<u>Security Clearance</u>			
TS and Below	5	3	5
SCI	3	6	6

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The Navy conducts a security risk evaluation if an employee with sensitive intelligence access is removed, or if removal is considered, under other than favorable circumstances. The evaluation examines: removal circumstances; the employee's security accesses; the scope of the category; the potential damage to national security if the information were made available to unauthorized recipients.

No one has yet been deemed a security risk if separated. If they were, the Naval Intelligence Security staff would work with the command's civilian personnel office and the Judge Adjutant General office to "explore the entire spectrum" of options within DOD/DON.

5) Views on the Polygraph Examination as a Security Tool

The Navy recognizes the merits of the polygraph as a screening tool, and finds it of even greater value in evaluating continuous access to sensitive material. Navy randomly selects 50 to 75 people to undergo a polygraph examination. They also have reference to the polygraph in their recruiting literature so that, should the policy be broadened, they can administer the examination to recruits.

6) NAPA Staff Views

Of the three services, the Navy's personnel security procedures were the most thoroughly presented, which may imply their procedures are themselves more thorough. Navy has also begun to randomly give polygraph examinations, and has thought ahead to incorporating it into pre-employment requirements. The panel could consider suggesting that the other services study Navy's processes

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